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Abstract
In this paper we study the formation and the stability of International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a pollution abatement model with
a quadratic cost function. Countries play a two-stage game: in the ﬁrst
stage each country decides to join or not the coalition while, in the -
second stage, the quantity of pollution abatement is chosen. To analyze
the stability of coalition structures in a multiple coalition game, we use
the notion of the Largest Consistent Set (LCS) which allows players to be
farsighted.
In an abstract context, Chwe (1994) developed the concept of farsighted
stability: an outcome is stable and it is in the LCS if and only if deviations
from it or potential further deviations are not unanimously preferred to
the original outcome by the coalition considering the deviations. Apply-
ing this notion of stability in the IEA context we assume that, when a
country or a sub-coalition contemplate exiting or joining an agreement,
it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own
actions.
We identify what would be the resulting stable structures and the LCS,
examining the indicator of countries’ environmental awareness proposed
by the model. A particular analysis is proposed about the Grand Coali-
tion. Moreover, we present a handy Maple algorithm to compare the cost
functions and to determine direct dominance.
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